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THE COILED SERPENT OF ARGUMENT: REASON, 
AUTHORITY, AND LAW IN A TALMUDIC TALE 
DAVID LUBAN* 
I. THE OVEN OF AKHNAI 
One of the most celebrated Talmudic parables begins with a re-
markably dry legal issue debated among a group of rabbis. A modern 
reader should think of the rabbis as a collegial court, very much like a 
secular appellate court, because the purpose of their debate is to gen-
erate edicts that will bind the community. The issue under debate 
concerns the ritual cleanliness of a baked earthenware stove, sliced 
horizontally into rings and cemented back together with unbaked 
mortar. Do the laws of purity that apply to uncut stoves apply to this 
one as well? This stove is the so-called "oven of Akhnai" (oven of 
serpents). Presumably, its horizontal bands separated by mortar made 
it look like a coiled serpent; but according to the Talmud, it is the 
oven ofAkhnai because the legal debate coiled the rabbis in serpen-
tine arguments. Therein lies a remarkable tale. l 
On that day, Rabbi Eli'ezer presented all the proofs in the world, 
but [the other Rabbis] did not accept them. [Rabbi Eli'ezer] said: 
"If the law is as I say, then this carob tree will prove it." The carob 
jumped a hundred cubits. (Some say: four hundred cubits.) They 
said: "One does not prove anything from a tree." Rabbi Eli'ezer 
then said: "If the law is as I say, then this aqueduct will prove it." 
The [water in the] aqueduct began to flow upstream. They said: 
"One does not prove anything from an aqueduct." Rabbi Eli'ezer 
said: "If the law is as I say, then the walls of the academy will prove 
it." The walls began to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua [Joshua] reprimanded 
* Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I would like to thank Thomas Grey and Michael Seidman for comments on the first draft. I 
presented this paper at the Georgetown Faculty Workshop and the Chicago-Kent College of 
Law "Law &" Symposium. I am grateful to participants in hoth for their comments. Special 
thanks to Claire Hill for encouraging me to write this Article. 
1. It is a tale whose significance for American legal theory has received extensive analysis 
in Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter- Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in 
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813,841-47,855-65 (1993). Stone's 
analysis intersects my own in numerous places; I note some as the paper proceeds. Stone 
observes that numerous writers on American legal theory have addressed the Oven of Akhnai 
story. See id. at 841 n.l54. 
1253 
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[the walls]: "If scholars argue a point of law, what business is it of 
yours?" To show respect for Rabbi Yehoshua, they did not fall fur-
ther; and to show respect for Rabbi Eli'ezer, they did not straighten 
up; and so they are still leaning. Then Rabbi Eli'ezer said: "If the 
law is as I say, it shall be proven from heaven." A bat kal [a divine 
voice or echo] pronounced: "What have you against Rabbi 
Eli'ezer? The law is always as he says." Rabbi Yehoshua then stood 
up and said: "It is not in heaven" (Deut. 30:12). What does this 
mean? Rabbi Yirmiyah (Jeremiah] said: "As the Torah has been 
given from Mount Sinai, we take no heed of a bat kal-for at 
Mount Sinai You have already written in the Torah [that we 
should] 'follow the majority. "'2 
There is more to the story than this. But this much is already 
stunning, and it already raises an important issue about, in the words 
of Scott J. Shapiro, "the paradoxical nature of authority .... Authori-
ties claim the right to impose their will on others regardless of 
whether their judgments are correct. In doing so, they appear to place 
themselves above the truth - their right does not seem to depend on 
their being right."3 Eliezer was right, and heaven itself proclaimed 
that he was right-but Joshua and the other rabbis insisted on their 
authority to ignore the voice of heaven. 
One might object to Shapiro'S way of posing the paradox by ob-
serving that he seems to treat matters of legal interpretation as 
though they are matters of fact, with a clear-cut right and wrong an-
swer. Although some answers to legal questions are plainly wrong 
("goats and grapefruits" is never the right answer to the legal ques-
tion "what is the speed limit?"), there may be more than one accept-
able answer to legal questions, and one job of authorities like courts 
is, plausibly, to settle on one such answer, not because it is uniquely 
right, but because it is reasonable and defensible and society needs a 
2. THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION: VOLUME ONE: AUTHORITY 263-64 (Michael 
Walzer et al. eds. & trans., 2000) [hereinafter: AUTHORITY] (translating BABYLONIAN 
TALMUD, Bava Melzia *59b). Because I read only a few words of Hebrew, I work with several 
translations (and a little help from my friends). Other translations are the old Soncino Press 
version, THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Nezikin, Baba Mezia 352-53 (H. Freedman trans., 
1935) [hereinafter: SONCINO TALMUD], and the new Artseroll/Mesorah edition, THE 
SCHOTTENSTEIN EDITION TALMUD BAVLl, 2 Tractate Bava Metzia 59aJ-59bJ (Rabbi Nosson 
Scherman & Rabbi Meir Zlotowitz, cds. & trans., 2001) [hereinafter: ARTSCROLL TALMUDI. 
TIle beautifully produced Artseroll edition, with its facing Hebrew and phrase-by-phrase trans-
lation, is particularly useful. 
The translations use various transliterations of the Hebrew names. I follow the follow-
ing convention: I will use the translation's version when I am quoting it-hence, "Eli'ezer," 
"Yehoshua," "Yirmiyah" - but a standard English transliteration in my own text. 
3. Scott J. Shapiro, Awhority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 383 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro cds., 2002). Shapiro introduces 
his article with the Oven of Akhnai story. Id. at 382. 
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single authoritative answer. Against this view, some legal philoso-
phers (most notably Ronald Dworkin) hold that there is one and only 
one right answer,4 so that assimilating matters of legal interpretation 
to matters of fact is no error. Shapiro's way of framing the paradox of 
authority fits comfortably with the right-answer thesis. I do not pro-
pose to review the debate over this thesis here, though I return to it 
subsequently. For the moment, we may content ourselves with notic-
ing that the Oven of Akhnai story plainly assumes the right-answer 
thesis. That's the whole point of bringing the bat kal into the story. It 
proclaims that Eliezer is right, and the news about the One Right 
Answer comes straight from the brooding omnipresence in the sky. 
So Shapiro's way of posing the paradox accurately captures what is 
going on in the Oven of Akhnai story. 
The story is a powerful one, and I suspect that one source of its 
power is that Eliezer's appeal to the bat ka! has strong psychological 
resonance with most readers. If you have ever been frustrated in an 
argument because the other people were simply not getting it, not 
seeing that you were right and they were wrong, you will surely sym-
pathize with Eliezer's passionate "Let heaven prove it!" and the fan-
tasy that some bat ka! might finally echo down from heaven and make 
them understand. In his film Annie Hall, Woody Allen finds himself 
standing in a theater line behind an obnoxious man pontificating 
about the theories of Marshall McLuhan. Allen immediately pro-
duces Marshall McLuhan, who tells the man, "You know nothing of 
my work!" To film this scene, Allen recruited the real Marshall 
McLuhan for a cameo appearance as a kind of bat ka!. The scene de-
lights us because· it fulfills an infantile fantasy we all have about fi-
nally making the idiots see that we're right and they are wrong. The 
fable of the bat kal, like Allen's cinematic fantasy, answers to a thor-
oughly objectivist image of the truth and a psychological need all of 
us sometimes feel to force the disbelievers to see what is indisput-
able. 5 
4. See Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS 
IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz cds., 1977). 
5. Robert Nozick, in a discussion of the coercive power of arguments, comments wryly on 
the fact that even though "philosophy is carried on as a coercive activity, the penalty philoso-
phers wield is, after all, rather weak," because the other person "can skip away happily main-
taining his previous belief." PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 4 (1990). Nozick goes on: 
"Perhaps philosophers need arguments so powerful they set up reverberations in the brain: if 
the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dies. How's that for a powerful argument? Yet. 
as with other physical threats ('your money or your life'), he can choose defiance. A 'perfect' 
philosophical argument would leave no choice." Id. 
HeinOnline -- 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1256 2004
1256 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW IVo179:1253 
But to the pig-headed, nothing is indisputable_ Rabbi Joshua 
won't even listen to the bat kol. Imagine that in a Supreme Court 
argument about the intent of the Framers of the Constitution you 
could march in James Madison, like Marshall McLuhan, to announce 
to the justices, "You know nothing of my workl" And then imagine 
that the Supreme Court says, in effect, "Go away, James Madison. 
Who cares what you say about your own intent'?" The willfulness of 
Rabbi Joshua seems equally perverse. He cares about his own author-
ity, it seems, more than he cares about the truth of what he says. But 
his authority rests solely on his claim to be expounding precisely the 
truth that he now insists he doesn't wish to hear. 
II. THE PLATONIC INTERPRETATION 
Let us move for a moment from Jerusalem to Athens. The prob-
lem here is one that deeply preoccupied Plato. In some sense, it was 
the central question of his philosophy (and thus of all Western phi-
losophy, if Whitehead was right that all philosophy is a series of foot-
notes to Plato). There is a difference between truth and mere opinion. 
But, Plato believed, the multitude consistently mistakes their own 
opinions for the truth, and most people don't really care to change 
their minds. Furthermore, the sophists-the lawyers-actually deny 
the distinction between truth and opinion. They care about winning 
arguments, not getting the right answer; and, when Socrates shows 
them that in reality they understand nothing, he wins nothing but 
their hostility. In the end, they kill Socrates. (Stay tuned to find out 
what happens to Rabbi Eliezer.) Plato's effort to ground the distinc-
tion between truth and opinion, and to expose the demagoguery of 
the sophists, drives the argument of many of his most famous dia-
logues, the Go rgias , Protagoras, Republic, Sophist, Theaetetus, 
Phaedrus, Laws, and-of course-the Apology, the trial of Socrates. 
In the Oven of Akhnai story, Rabbi Joshua assumes the role of the 
Sophist-his "It is not in heavenl" sounds remarkably similar to 
Protagoras's "Man is the measure of all things" -and Eliezer plays 
Socrates. 
This Platonic and objectivist interpretation appears to be a 
straightforward way of reading the Oven of Akhnai parable. But I 
have not given the whole parable yet, and as we add more of the story 
we will discover that this is not the only way of reading it. In the pages 
that follow, I aim to explore some alternative readings of the fable, 
each of which-I hope-sheds additional light on the problems of 
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truth, authority, and interpretation that the story raises. Call the first 
reading, the one I have just offered, the Platonic interpretation. In it, 
Eliezer is the good guy, and Joshua represents the forces of authori-
tarian sophistry ranged against the good and the true. 
III. GOD SMILED: THE HUMANISTIC INTERPRETATION 
The follow-up on the part of the story already told immediately 
casts doubt on the Platonic interpretation. 
[Some time later,1 Rabbi Natan met Elijah [the prophet]. He asked 
him: "What did the Holy One do at that moment?" [that is, the 
moment when Rabbi Yehoshua said "It is not in heaven!"] Elijah 
replied: "God smiled and said: 'My children have defeated me, my 
children have defeated me.'''6 
God's amusement as He admits defeat is certainly one of the 
most startling images in any monotheistic religious text I am aware of. 
The philosopher Ted Cohen thinks that laughing at logical absurdi-
ties-absurdities like a group of rabbis disregarding God's will to win 
a debate about its meaning-is closely connected with the roots of 
Jewish humor.7 I do not know whether Cohen is right about the 
unique Jewishness of making jokes based on logic pushed to the point 
of absurdity, but he is certainly right that it fits in with a significant 
strain within Jewish culture-and, I will argue, this is the strain that 
corresponds most closely with contemporary secular legal culture. 
A. Cheder Culture and Debate 
The Jews are the People of the Book, engaged in what historian 
Paul Johnson once called a "great enterprise in social metaphysics,"s 
namely organizing an entire way of life around a body of law spun out 
of books by scholars and students studying and arguing together in a 
cheder, a school. First among those books is the Torah, the Five 
Books of Moses, and especially the laws given in the book of Deuter-
onomy. Taking the Torah, and the rest of the Hebrew Bible, as their 
starting point, the rabbis created the Oral Torah, the corpus of elabo-
rations and interpretations that a secular lawyer may think of as 
n. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 204 (translating Bava Metzia *5%). Other translations 
say that God laughed, not smiled, but the verb (chaich) means "to smile"; "to laugh" is lzachek. 
But I don't think anything turns on this point of translation. In both translations, the point is to 
give God a sense of humor. 
7. TED COHEN, JOKES: PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS ON JOKING MATTERS 45-68 (1999). 
Cohen makes this point specifically about the Oven of Akhnai story. [d. at 57. 
X. PAULJOHNSON, A HISTORY OFTHE JEWS 149 (1987). 
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corresponding roughly to the common law or, in a civil law system, 
the jurisprudence growing out of the civil code. In the second century, 
some influential rabbis (led by Rabbi Judah the Prince) codified the 
Oral Torah into a bulky legal treatise, the Mishnah. "Codified" and 
"treatise" are not exactly the right words, however, because the 
Mishnah is structured as a series of fragmentary arguments among 
legendary rabbis, and frequently their arguments are left unresolved. 
The original purpose of the Mishnah remains mysterious; no one 
knows whether it was intended as a legal code, a schoolbook, or 
something else entirely.9 The Mishnah in its turn received oral elabo-
ration, and three hundred years later some of these rabbinical debates 
were recorded in the vast, multi-volume Babylonian Talmud. The 
Mishnah and Talmud (together referred to collectively as "Gemara"), 
plus a few other collections of rabbinic debates, became in their own 
turn the source-books for the sprawling bodies of interpretations and 
responsa that make up the Oral Torah, which to this day continues to 
expand in observant communities. 
Like the Mishnah, the Talmud takes the literary form of an 
enormously elaborated dialogue among legendary rabbis. The Tal-
mud proceeds through the Mishnah, clause by clause, with the rabbis 
debating fine points of law and interpretation, and frequently going 
off on tangents. Their debates, like those in the Mishnah itself, are 
frequently left inconclusive. to In the eleventh century, Rashi, the most 
influential sage of the middle ages, wrote a line-by-line commentary 
on the Talmud, and a group of Rashi's descendants wrote another. 
Since then, every printed edition of the Talmud includes both com-
mentaries, arranged around the margins of the pages so that the 
commentaries surround the text. The visual appearance of the pages 
is striking. A reader examining a page of the Talmud, with its text 
surrounded by text surrounded by text will have little difficulty un-
derstanding the imagery of the Oven of Akhnai, with rabbis enwrap-
ping the oven with discussions like a coiled snake. Each page is 
printed in coils of argument. Thus, the entire Gemara, the central 
legal source-book of traditional Judaism, takes the form not of a 
hornbook but a dialogue, a never-ending polyphonic argument in an 
idealized cheder. The text itself mirrors the form of life- self-
9. THE MISHNAH: A NEW TRANSLATION at xiii (Jacob Neusner trans., 1988) Ihereinafter 
MISHNAH NEW TRANSLATION I. 
ID. For a useful discussion of the hermeneutic possibilities in this body of texts, see 
MICHAEL FISHBANE, Law, Story, and Interpretacioll: Reading Rabbillic Texcs, in AUTHORITY, 
supra note 2, at xxxix. 
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government through endless legal argument-to which it gave rise. 
With no state of their own, no authority to enact enforceable legisla-
tion, and no police, Jewish communities in the Diaspora had only the 
rabbis and the cheder to fall back upon. 
Recognizing the centrality of the cheder as a social institution - it 
is at once school, legal academy, parliament, and public forum-helps 
us understand the amazing imagery of God smiling in delight as His 
children defeat him at the game of dialectic. Of course the primary 
imagery is of an indulgent parent smiling and conceding a point to a 
well-loved, clever, argumentative child. But it is equally a scene from 
a cheder with God as teacher. Every teacher will immediately recog-
nize God's amused affection at Joshua and Jeremiah. A tennis coach 
whose pupil wins a nifty point from her, a chess teacher whose stu-
dent finds a winning move that the teacher overlooked, a law profes-
sor whose students notice something important in a judicial opinion 
that the professor had never thought of, will all smile to themselves 
and think "My children have defeated me!" -even if, or especially if, 
the teacher knows that it isn't likely to happen again for quite a while. 
God's response is, quite simply, a teacher's delight at the success of 
the academic enterprise - the growing skill and independence of his 
or her students. 
This is, one might say, a humanistic, feel-good reading of the 
Oven of Akhnai story, and for short I will refer to it as the humanistic 
interpretationY Instead of a wrathful God who strikes down Rabbi 
Joshua for spurning the divine voice, God chuckles indulgently at the 
clever bit of dialectic that Joshua uses to trap the Almighty in His 
own words. For of course what Joshua has done-at least as Rabbi 
Jeremiah interprets him-is nothing more than pointing out that a 
prior commandment of God, the "follow the majority" passage in 
Exodus 23:2, has preempted the bat kol. A human cannot really de-
feat God. All that a human can do is appeal to God against Himself. 
It's like the method for playing simultaneous chess against two pow-
erful champions. Play the white pieces against one, and the black 
pieces against the other. Place the champions in separate rooms. Ob-
serve the first champion's move with the white piece, then go into the 
11. We find it, for example, in JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY 156 (1991). Rabbi 
Telushkin's well-known pedagogic book quotes the scholar Hyam Maccoby: "This extraordi-
nary story strikes the keynote of the Talmud. God is a good father who wants His children to 
grow up and achieve independence." Id. Stone notes that Robert Burt adopts the humanistic 
interpretation. Stone. supra note I, at 841-43 (citing Robert A. Burt. Precedent and Alllhoril), in 
Anlonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. Hi85, 1691-92 n.31 (I 991)). 
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other room and play the identical move against the other champion. 
Wait to see what he replies with the black pieces, then go back into 
the first room and play that move against the first champion. In effect, 
you are playing the two champions against each other, and you get at 
least one win (or two draws) out of the games. 
B. Wit-Versus-Might Stories and the Rule of Law 
Rabbi Joshua's method of using God's own rules to evade the 
outcome dictated by the bat kol carries powerful resonance in Jewish 
culture. A favorite genre within Diaspora Jewish folk-humor con-
cerns the powerless Jew who outwits a powerful persecutor by trap-
ping him in his own rules. One might call these wit-versus-might 
stories. For example: 
The Grand Inquisitor in Seville trumps up accusations 
against Rabbi Pmkhes, the leader of the Jewish community. 
He orders a trial by divine will: the rabbi must draw one of 
two rolled-up pieces of paper, with "guilty" and "innocent" 
written on them, and if he draws the slip marked "guilty" he 
will be executed. The whole town gathers to watch the spec-
tacle. Secretly, the malicious Inquisitor writes "guilty' on 
both pieces of paper. But the rabbi suspects that this is what 
the Inquisitor has done, and when he draws his piece of pa-
per, instead of reading it he immediately pops it in his mouth 
and swallows it. The Inquisitor leaps to his feet in astonish-
ment and anger. The rabbi calmly says, "Don't worry, your 
excellency. You still have the other piece of paper, and from 
it you can learn the verdict. If it says 'innocent' I must have 
chosen 'guilty'; and if it says 'guilty' then I must have chosen 
'innocent.'" Rabbi Pinkhes's quick thinking saves him.12 
Or this one: 
Zev Ben Shmuel has become a court jester in Babylonia-
until he imprudently responds in kind to an anti-Jewish insult 
from a Babylonian nobleman, and under pressure from the 
outraged nobleman the king reluctantly sentences him to 
death. The king, however, grants Zev one final favor: he gets 
to choose the manner of hIS death. "Hanging, poisoning, be- . 
ing devoured by wild beasts, anything you wish, we shall 
carry it out." Zev replies, very simply, "Old age." To keep his 
word, the king releases Zev, and Zev indeed lives to a ripe 
old age. 13 
12. NINA JAFFE & STEVE ZEITLIN. WHILE STANDING ON ONE FOOT: PUZZLE STORIES 
AND WISDOM TALES FROM THE JEWISH TRADITION 7-10 (1993). 
13. Id. at 23-25. 
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Or this: 
A wicked caliph devises a plan to eliminate the Jews in his 
kingdom. He mstructs the guards to ask every Jew to say 
something about himself. If he lies, they are told to behead 
him; but If he tells the truth, they are to hang him. Benjamin, 
a Moroccan Jew, comes to the kingdom on business, and the 
guards seize him and order him to tell them something about 
himself, explaining the caliph's murderous order with a mali-
cious smirk. What does Benjamin reply to save himself? 
The answer: he says, "Today you will behead me." Of course, 
if they behead him he has told the truth, and they have dis-
obeyed the caliph's orders to hang, not behead, the truth-
tellers. But they also disobey if they hang him, for hanging is 
the fate reserved for truth-tellers, and he hasn't told the 
truth. The only way they can avoid disobedience is to do nei-
ther, and Benjamin hastily returns to Morocco with his life 
intact.14 
1261 
Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of similar stories and jokes exist, all 
set in the framework of the persecution and oppression of Diaspora 
Jews. 
As the last story illustrates, they fit in with a familiar modern 
genre of logic puzzles. Logician and puzzle-master Raymond 
Smullyan offers a typical example (which I mention now because we 
shall return to it later). The king in the Arabian Nights grows tired of 
Scheherazade's stories and announces that he must now execute her. 
The quick-witted Scheherazade makes a last request: "'I will ask you 
a question,' said Scheherazade, 'a question answerable by yes or no. 
All that 1 ask is that you answer yes or no, and that you promise to 
answer truthfully."'15 Confronted with such a seemingly-harmless re-
quest, the king gives his word. Scheherazade then poses her question, 
and as he works out the answer, the king discovers (to his own secret 
delight) that to keep his word he cannot execute her. What is 
Scheherazade's question? (Before reading the answer in the footnote, 
you may want to try your hand at solving the puzzle. 16) Obviously, 
14. [d. at 34-37. The greatest of all these stories. however, is the tale of Berl and the Priest, 
in COHEN, supra note 7, at 91-94. It is too lengthy to reproduce here, so I'm afraid you have no 
alternative but to find a copy of Cohen's book (which has a lot of great jokes in it, as well as 
many interesting thoughts about the significance of jokes). 
15. RAYMOND SMULLYAN, THE RIDDLE OF SCHEHERAZADE AND OTHER AMAZING 
PUZZLES, ANCIENT AND MODERN 79 (1997). 
16. One question that works is this: "Will you answer this question no and take my life?" 
On purely logical grounds, the king cannot answer "yes," because then his answer to the "will 
you answer this question no?" clause would be false. And if he answers "no" and executes her, 
he will likewise have broken his word: his answer to the entire two-part question would be false. 
Thus the only way to keep his word is to answer "no" and spare Scheherazade. Id. at 223. The 
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Smullyan's Scheherazade story is nothing but a wit-versus-might story 
in which the clever Jew is disguised in clever-Arab-princess' clothing. 
What is striking about the wit-versus-might stories is that they 
merge so seamlessly with the cheder culture of legalism, rules, and 
argument. Of course, nothing actually prevents the Inquisitor from 
ordering the rabbi's death-nothing except his own word and his own 
rules. The Diaspora Jew, without an army or a martial culture, has 
just one weapon to use against the oppressor: his wits, sharpened by 
hundreds of hours of cheder dialectic, coupled with the weak com-
mitment of his oppressor to maintain at least a semblance of respect 
for the rules of law and of logic. If the chief virtue of a rule-of-Iaw 
culture lies in substituting rational debate for violence, in order to 
protect the weak, then the wit-versus-might stories represent the rule 
of law in microcosm. And Rabbi Jeremiah's interpretation of Joshua's 
"It is not in heaven!", with its dialectical trick of pre-empting the bat 
kol with the Torah, may stand as a kind of paean to the humanizing 
power of the rule of law. (Of course, in this story God is not a mali-
cious oppressor, and his reaction is delighted amusement and not the 
Inquisitor's frustrated rage.) 
C. Truth as Coercion 
The humanistic interpretation of the Oven of Akhnai story dis-
plays Rabbi Eliezer in an entirely different light from the Platonic 
interpretation. In the Platonic interpretation, Eliezer was Socrates 
confronting authoritarian sophists. In the humanistic interpretation, 
Eliezer is the true authoritarian. When he fails to convince the other 
rabbis with arguments, he resorts to magic and brute force. The dead 
giveaway is his third miracle: "If the Halakhah accords with me, let 
the walls of the study hall prove it," at which point the walls begin to 
collapse on the rabbis. In his growing anger and frustration, Eliezer 
resorts to physical threats; like the blind Samson, he prepares to bring 
the building down on the rabbis' heads. Symbolically, he attempts to 
demolish the entire practice of dialectic and argument, of give and 
take within the culture. 17 The walls of the cheder, which the tale tells 
question "Will you either answer this question no or spare my life?" does the job equally well: 
the answer "no" is false because its truth logically contradicts the first clause of the question, 
while the answer "yes" can be truthful only if he spares her life. Id. at 222-23. 
17. Scott Shapiro'S interpretation of the Oven of Akhnai emphasizes a similar point: 
Eliezer manifested a vice that is not uncommon among the pious, a vice which might 
be called "excessive purism." Excessive purists always insist on acting in the technically 
right manner. They refuse to corrupt themselves, to dirty their hands by descending to 
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us are leaning to this day under the countervailing pressures of Rabbi 
Eliezer's command and Rabbi Joshua's rebuke, offer a powerful 
metaphor for the edifice of the law, whose crookedness reflects the 
countervailing pressures of force and argument, violence and the 
word. ls 
The sequence of miracles escalates step by step. First, Eliezer 
displays a single act of power, uprooting and transporting a tree. 
When this fails to convince the rabbis, he reverses the flow of water-
a less gaudy miracle than uprooting the tree, but a more impressive 
one: he has reversed the course of nature, not simply displayed a sin-
gle act of might. Then comes the collapsing schoolhouse, with its sin-
ister implication of violence against the other rabbis. But none of 
these move the rabbis, because, as they observe, you can't prove a 
point of law with a carob tree or an aqueduct or even the destruction 
of the schoolhouse. 
But what about the bat kol? The fact is that even the bat kol pre-
sents no arguments on the merits of the legal issue-it asserts 
Eliezer's personal authority by fiat, not reason. ("The law is always as 
he says.") Of course, one might reply that Eliezer has already offered 
"all the arguments in the world," and the bat kol has no need to re-
peat them, merely to announce once and for all that they are right. 
But the fact remains that the bat kol has cut the Gordian knot of 
coiled arguments with a peremptory announcement. This is truth as 
coercion. As Hannah Arendt observed in a remarkable essay on truth 
and politics: "Truth carries within itself an element of coercion," be-
cause propositions "once perceived as true ... have in common that 
they are beyond agreement, dispute, opinion, or consent. "19 That 
seems to be what Eliezer aims for when he invokes the bat kol. 
the level of the lumpenproletariat and to act as the benighted do. However, ... one can 
have reasons to abide by the will o[ another, even when one knows that they are 
wrong. To loftily stay above the fray can manifest extreme disrespect [or one's fellow 
citizens. 
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 439. Shapiro's argument differs from the one I offer here, however. He 
argues that deferring to the majority enhances their autonomy; it "pays respect to the impor-
tance that people are allotted a certain control over their lives and the fairness o[ sharing that 
power equally." [d. at 438. 
18. One thinks o[ Holmes's argument that a judge's job is "to express ... the resultant ... 
of the pressure of the past and the conflicting wills of the present." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR., Twenty Years in Retrospect, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES 154, 156 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962). 
19. HANNAH ARENDT, Trwh and Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT 
EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 227,239-40 (rev. ed. 1968); see also Nozick, supra note 5. 
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Stuart Hampshire draws a useful distinction between two forms 
of human reason. One, modeled on mathematical proof, is "a process 
in the inner consciousness of the solitary thinker,"20 and it consists of 
deductions that logically compel the thinker to specific conclusions. 
The other is modeled on public· debate, the back-and-forth weighing 
of competing standpoints aiming at persuasion (not compulsion) and 
culminating in a decision that logic alone cannot dictate. During 
childhood we learn the practices of debate in family scenes "of assert-
ing, contradicting, deciding, predicting, recalling, approving and dis-
approving, admiring, blaming, rejecting and accepting, and many 
more."21 We learn to internalize these practices, and "[d]iscussions in 
the inner forum of an individual mind naturally duplicate in form and 
structure the public adversarial discussions. "22 Hampshire and Arendt 
are both eager to restore equal dignity to the latter form of rational-
ity, the public-dialogical form, rather than following the Cartesian 
philosophical tradition by focusing exclusively on mathematical dem-
onstration as the paradigm of reason.23 The hallmark of public-
dialogic reasoning is the recognition of human plurality and of the 
need to reach conclusions by means other than blowing away the 
other side with arguments that simply cannot be contradicted. A 
Midrash (commentary) on the Psalms, celebrating the polyphony 
inherent in the Law, expresses this point of view as a metaphysical 
fact about legal texts: 
Rabbi Yannai said: The clauses of the Torah were not given as 
clear-cut [edicts]. Rather, concerning each clause that the Holy One 
imparted to Moses, He would impart forty-nine reasons to [rule] 
"pure" and forty-nine reasons to [rule] "impure." 
[Moses] said before Him: Master of the Universe, how long? Let us 
clarify the matter! 
He answered: "Follow the majority!" If the majority rule "impure," 
it is impure; if the majority rule "pure," it is pure.24 
In these terms, the rabbis in the Oven of Akhnai parable are en-
gaging in the form of reasoning appropriate to human affairs, the col-
lective give-and-take of argument culminating in a majority decision; 
20. STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE Is CONFLICT II (2000). 
21. Id. at 12. 
22. ld. at 9. 
23. Of course, the distinction cannot be as stark as Hampshire suggests: public debates 
include logical argumentation. and (conversely) sound arguments anticipate and answer poten-
tial ohjections. But notwithstanding the overlap, I believe that the distinction makes intuitive 
sense. 
24. AUTI-IORITY, supra note 2, at 317 (quoting Midrash Psalms 12). 
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it is Eliezer who wants to short-circuit and trump human rationality 
by substituting divine warrant. As Arendt argues, 
The trouble is that ... truth ... peremptorily claims to be acknowl-
edged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very es-
sence of political life. The modes of thought and communication 
that deal with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are nec-
essarily domineering; they don't take into account other people's 
opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly 
political thinking.25 
One obvious question arises: why should we accept political 
thinking about the interpretation of the law rather than insisting on 
truthful thinking? Implicitly, the Oven of Akhnai story answers this 
question in Rabbi Joshua's proclamation of the line from Deuteron-
omy: "It is not in Heaven!" Let us examine the context of this line, 
which appears during the covenant between the Children of Israel 
and God at Moab: 
Surely, this Instruction [mitzvah] which I enjoin upon you this day 
is not too baft1ing for you, nor is it beyond reach. It is not in 
heaven, that you should say, "Who among us can go up to heaven 
and get it for us, and impart it to us, that we may observe it?" Nei-
ther is it beyond the sea, that you should say, "Who among us can 
cross to the other side of the sea and get it for us and impart it to us, 
that we may observe it?" No, the thing is very close to you, in your 
mouth and in your heart, to observe it.26 
In effect, Moses is saying that the law is fundamentally transpar-
ent. It is not an esoteric teaching meant only for initiates or prophets 
or experts. (Oddly enough, it's the Bible, not Justice Holmes, that 
first informs us that the law is not a brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.) In the Oven of Akhnai story, Joshua reasons in reverse from this 
passage: any interpretation of the law that cannot persuade the rabbis 
without the intervention of a bat kat cannot be the law as Moses 
describes it, namely a law that is not in heaven. The law, one might 
say, cannot be too fancy for ordinary people to grasp, or else it isn't 
the law.27 And if a legal proposition cannot persuade the rabbis with-
25. ARENDT, supra note 19, at 241. 
26. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 16 (quoting Deuteronomy 30:11-14). 
27. This argument has some affinities to Daniel Farber's critique of brilliance in legal 
theory: 
Most theories of constitutional law rest on some notion of the consent of the governed, 
either through tacit institutional acquiescence or through some kind of social contract 
theory. A brilliant theory is by definition one that would not occur to most people. It is 
hard to see how the vast majority of the population can be presumed to have agreed to 
something that they could not conceive of. Who would know better than the average 
person what the average person has consented to? How can someone have consented 
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out the intervention of a bat kol, it is too fancy for ordinary people to 
grasp. Ergo, it isn't the law. 
D. Jeremiah's Sophism 
Jeremiah explicates Joshua's argument differently, and I turn 
next to his explication.28 It is really in his further interpretation that 
the rabbis work their logical trick on God. According to Jeremiah, the 
reason for ignoring the bat kol is that the Torah was already given at 
Mount Sinai, and the Torah states that one must follow the majority. 
Hence, even if the bat kal states that the majority is wrong, the prior 
injunction to follow the majority provides an exclusionary reason to 
disregard the bat kol. 
To complete the argument, one would have to show why the in-
junction to follow the majority takes priority over the bat kol, that is, 
why it is an exclusionary reason, and also why the injunction applies 
even when the majority is demonstrably wrong. But trouble arises 
even apart from these worries. The trouble is that Jeremiah's argu-
ment rips the words "follow the majority" out of a context that in fact 
says exactly the opposite. The full passage in the Torah from which he 
is quoting reads: "You shall not follow the majority to do wrong."29 It 
appears, then, as though Jeremiah has not defeated the Master of the 
World with an ingenious point of logic, but rather that he has pre-
vailed by cheating. 
One response to this objection is that Jeremiah's interpretive 
method-plucking words out of context regardless of its meaning and 
spinning law out of them-is a traditional technique of Jewish herme-
neutics. Rabbi Akiva was said to derive rulings from a single letter of 
to a position that is so novel and clever that only one person on earth has ever thought 
of it? 
Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 925 (1986). Some might 
say that this argument cannot apply to non-consensual divine commandments- but it is signifi-
cant that the "not in heaven" passage occurs during the course of a covenant between the Israel-
ites and God, and indeed, Judaism as a covenantal religion locates the binding force of the law 
in consent, not command. See AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 6-46. However. Joshua relies on the 
"not in heaven" paragraph, not the notion of consent, to demonstrate that legal interpretations 
un persuasive to the rabbis absent divine intervention cannot really be the law. His argument is 
therefore parallel to, not identical with, Farber's. 
28. The Artscroll edition interpolates language stating that this explication is Joshua's, not 
Jeremiah's. Artscroll Talmud, Bava Metzia, supra note 2. at 59b!. I follow the translation in 
AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264, as well as the Soncino Talmud, supra note 2, both of which 
attribute the paragraph to Jeremiah. Follow the majority. 
29. See AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 n.9, 317 (l\uoting Exodus 23:2). 
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a single word in the Torah. 3D In effect, the rabbis treated the words 
and phrases of the Torah not as a text demanding a sympathetic read-
ing, but rather as a repository of language-fragments, a kind of lexi-
con or even alphabet providing the raw material for legal rulings. 
Perhaps a better metaphor would be that the phrases of the Torah 
resemble a set of musical motifs that interpreters weave into their 
compositions, like Wagner writing his operas or jazz players jamming. 
The rabbis would not have described the Torah as a lexicon. 
They would have said that because the Torah comes directly from 
God, nothing about it can be contingent or accidental. Every letter of 
every word is exactly what it must be, every fragment conveys its own 
truth, and so the interpreter is entitled to whatever inferences can be 
drawn from the fragments considered singly.JI The high-water mark 
of this kind of Torah-mysticism is the peculiar interpretive technique 
known as Gematria, a method used by the medieval kabbalists to 
discover secret meanings in the Torah. Every letter of the alphabet 
corresponds with a number, and kabbalistic numerology permitted 
intersubstitution in the text of the Torah of any word with the same 
number as a word in the original text. The practice rested on the ab-
solute non-contingency of the Torah-if the word behemah (beast) 
has the numerical value 52, that cannot be an accident according to 
the kabbalists-and this Torah mysticism likewise provides a meta-
physical justification for the rabbis' peculiar hermeneutic practice of 
wrenching verbal fragments of the Torah (such as "follow the major-
ity") out of their context.32 I take it that this metaphysical-mystical 
justification has no secular counterpart, and is therefore of little 
interest to secular legal theory. 
However, there is a less occult justification for Jeremiah's appro-
priation of the clause "follow the majority" that does indeed have a 
more universal theoretical significance. The full phrase, "You shall 
not follow the majority to do wrong," raises the obvious question of 
how we are to know when the majority is wrong. What standard other 
than the opinion of the majority do we have for making that determi-
nation? In the Book of Exodus, there is an answer to this question, 
namely that Moses the prophet is in direct communication with God, 
and transmits the divine word directly to the Israelites. Maimonides 
30. AUTHORITY, supra note 2. at 262. 
31. See Stone, supra note I, at 864. 
32. See GERSHOM SCHOLEM, KABBALAH 168-74, 337-43 (1974) (discussing kabbalistic 
theory of the Torah and Gematria, respectively). 
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argued that the prophecy of Moses was a unique, epistemically privi-
leged moment in Jewish history, the moment when God's will was 
made transparent to the Israelites.33 But the Mosaic period is over, 
and it will never be replicated. That, at any rate, is the standard read-
ing of the final sentence of the Torah: 
Never again did there arise in Israel a prophet like Moses-whom 
the Lord singled out, face to face, for the various signs and portents 
that the Lord sent him to display in the land of Egypt, against 
Pharaoh and all his courtiers and his whole country, and for all the 
great might and awesome power that Moses displayed before all 
Israel. 34 
To be sure, the Bible recognizes other prophets who arose in the 
land of Israel, but none provided the direct line to God that Moses 
did, and eventually the line of prophecy petered OUt.35 If the Mosaic 
period represented a kind of epistemic golden age, then the period of 
the later prophets was an age of silver, and we now dwell in the age of 
bronze or clay. In the age of bronze, lacking a Moses, or even an 
Amos or Isaiah, there remains no better guide to right and wrong 
than the majority opinion of the wisest and most learned sages, the 
hakhamim. 
Not that the hakhamim regarded their own deliberations as 
third-rate knowledge. An extraordinary Talmudic passage states ex-
plicitly that sages are superior to prophets, and even to the Torah 
itself.36 Jeremiah does not go that far, of course, because it is the To-
rah that he cites as authority for disregarding the bat kal; but there 
seems to be little doubt that Jeremiah is rejecting the claims of 
prophecy to prevail over the debates of the sages. We may gloss 
Jeremiah's seemingly-perverse wrenching of "follow the majority" 
out of its original "do not follow the majority" context as an elliptical 
argument along the following lines: 
33. See the discussion of prophecy in AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 225-31 (quoting 
Maimonides' Mishneh Torah). 
34. THE TORAH: THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 405 (1962) (quoting Deuteronomy 34:10-
12). 
35. See the passage on the decline of prophecy in AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 257-58 
(quoting Tosefta Sotah). 
36. On the superiority of the sages to the prophets, see AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 258-
59 (translating Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra *12a-b), and the explication of this passage by 
the twelfth-century rabbi Joseph ibn Migash, id. at 259-60. On the superiority of the sages to the 
Torah itself, see id. at 261-62 (translating Midrash Rabbah: Song of Songs 1:2 and Babylonian 
Talmud, Menahot *29h) (the latter is a remarkahle passage in which God miraculously sets 
Moses down in Rabhi Akiva's Talmudic academy, and Moses discovers that he lacks the skills to 
follow the scholars' subtle debates about the meaning of the Torah). 
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In Mosaic times, the commandment against following the ma-
jority in wrong was perfectly coherent because the prophecy 
of Moses provided transparent access to knowledge of right 
and wrong. But without the direct line to the Divine Word 
provided uniquely by Moses, and never replicated, the nega-
tive implication of the rule is that now we have no alternative 
to following the majority of the sages, because their debates 
remain the most relIable procedure for determining right and 
wrong. 
1269 
On this reading, the bat kol has arrived on the scene too late, in an 
epoch when prophecy no longer counts as the right method of dis-
cerning the law. 
One other aspect of the Oven of Akhnai story reinforces this 
reading. Rabbi Eliezer's sequence of miracles seems rather clearly 
modeled on the series of miracles that God commands Moses to per-
form in Egypt to persuade the Israelites of his authenticity (Exodus 
4:1-9). But, the story intimates, Eliezer is no Moses. So the point of 
the parallel is that we don't live in Deuteronomic times, but rather in 
times when God's will is hidden and we must make do with purely 
human forms of legal reasoning. Even though the law is divine, we 
must behave as though we are secular interpreters, not miracle-
workers or seers. 
It might be objected that Eliezer's miracles do offer evidence 
that his interpretation of the law is correct. Human beings cannot 
uproot carob trees, reverse the flow of water, collapse the walls of a 
house, or summon up divine voices merely by their say-so. Hence, 
Eliezer must be assisted by supernatural forces, and when he says, "If 
the law agrees with me, these miracles will prove it," God evidently 
answers his prayers and validates his claims. 
But not only does the Oven of Akhnai story explicitly state that 
miracles don't prove points of law, it subtly casts doubt on the power 
of miracles to prove anything. Consider the peculiar aside that ap-
pears, almost tongue in cheek, when the Talmud recounts Eliezer's 
first miracle. "The carob jumped a hundred cubits. (Some say: four 
hundred CUbits.)" Why the second sentence? One answer is surely 
that by means of this literary device the narrator of the story (the 
starn, the anonymous teacher in the Talmud) makes it clear that he 
wasn't there, and that the story has come down to us in multiple ver-
sions. It is a distancing device, a device to remind the reader that the 
story is, after all, just a story. In addition, though, the disagreement 
over how far the carob tree jumped suggests that the perceptions of 
the eye-witnesses diverged. It reminds us that tales of miracles are 
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themselves infected by human fallibility in perception and memory. 
In effect, it reminds us that the proof-power of miracles cannot rise 
higher than the fallible perceptions of the observers. As Hume ar-
gued, precisely because a miracle is an interruption of the ordinary 
course of nature, it is always just as probable that my own perception 
has inexplicably failed as it is that the course of nature has inexplica-
bly failed; and so miracles can never carry their own epistemic war-
rantY It follows (as both Hume and Kierkegaard argue) that the 
interpretation of any observational evidence as a miracle, a divine 
intervention, is a matter of faith and not of fact, and that will be 
equally true for eyewitnesses and for those who receive their testi-
mony second- or third-hand.38 The facts of human fallibility and hu-
man disagreement cannot be evaded except by a leap of faith that 
undermines the power of the miracle to prove anything at alL 
These arguments, unlike the metaphysical-mystical justification 
for "follow the majority," do have importance and resonance for legal 
theorists. On this way of reading the Oven of Akhnai story, its point 
seems to be that fallible human beings have no more reliable guide to 
the correct interpretation of law than their own collective delibera-
tions and votes-even under the strong assumption that in God's eyes 
every question arising under the law has exactly one right answer. 
Jeremy Waldron has argued precisely this point (convincingly, to my 
mind) in connection with the view of some natural lawyers that law 
has to do with objective moral truth. Waldron points out that the ob-
jectivity of moral truth is largely beside the point because no agreed-
upon method exists for determining moral truth.39 Dworkin's right-
answer thesis, even if true, settles nothing. As Arendt puts it, truth 
appears in the market place under the guise of opinion.40 That is, even 
if morality is a matter of objective truth and not opinion, the lack of 
methods for ascertaining the truth means that we will never do better 
than debating different people's opinions about what the objective 
truth is, then settling the matter by some non-truth-related method 
like voting. If it is not in heaven, "follow the majority" seems more 
reliable than the rule "follow the objective truth," because what I 
37. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 114-16 (L. A. Selby Bigge ed., 1902). 
38. S0REN KIERKEGAARD, PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS 126-32 (David Swenson trans. 
1962). 
39. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objeccivily, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158, 
171-77 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
40. ARENDT, supra note 19, at 238. 
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take to be the objective truth may simply be my own mistaken opin-
ion.41 
IV. THE POWER INTERPRETATION 
A. The Rabbis as Grand Inquisitors 
There is another way to look at the story, however, which comes 
to the fore when we read its continuation. What happens next after 
God smiles and says "My children have defeated me"? The story con-
tinues: 
It is related that on that day the rabbis collected everything that 
Rabbi Eli'ezer had pronounced pure and burned it in a fire. Then 
they voted on him and placed him under the ban [i.e., excommuni-
cated him ].42 
So much for the feel-good, humanistic cheder. The rabbis are 
playing hardball. After the vote to excommunicate Eliezer, Rabbi 
Akiva insists on communicating the news to him personally, in order 
to put it in the gentlest, most delicate way. 
They said: who will go and inform him? R'Akiva said to them: I will 
go, for I am concerned that perhaps an unfit person will go and in-
form him and bring about the destruction of the entire world. What 
did R' Akiva do to inform R'Eliezer? He dressed in black clothing, 
and cloaked himself in black, and sat before [R'Eliezer] at a dis-
tance of four amos. R'Eliezer said to him: Akiva, why is today dif-
ferent from other days? Why are you sitting so far away from me 
today? [R' Akiva] replied to him: My teacher, it seems to me that 
your colleagues are removed from yoU.43 
Rather than, "you are excommunicated by your colleagues." A 
nice touch, perhaps, but the effect is nevertheless devastating. 
[Rabbi Eli'ezer] tore his clothes and took off his shoes and sat 
down on the ground. Tears fell from his eyes; then the world was 
afflicted: one third of the olives, one third of the wheat, one third of 
41. This is a different argument than that implicit in the Midrash on the Psalms, supra note 
24, which is a metaphysical claim that there is no objectively right answer to any legal question, 
because "the clauses of the Torah were not given as clear-cut edicts." Waldron's is an argument 
about the inherent inability of human beings to agree on objective moral truths; the Midrash's is 
an argument about the inherent plurality of moral truth. 
42. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 (translating Bava Metzia, *59b). 
43. Artscroll Talmud, supra note 2, at 59b'(translating Bava Metzi, *59b). (I have switched 
translations here because the passage in question was c1iueu from the translation I have useu for 
the rest of the story.) 
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the barley .... It is said: "There was great woe that day, for every 
spot toward which Rabbi Eli'ezer directed his eyes was burned."44 
The affront against divine truth is not so easily dispensed with; 
the world itself is diminished. The imagery of the affliction is remark-
able. The first image, of the destruction of olives, wheat, and barley, 
seems to respond to the prophecy of Deuteronomy 11:13-17: If you 
disobey the divine law, "the Lord's anger will flare up against you, 
and He will shut up the skies so that there will be no rain and the 
ground will not yield its produce; and you will soon perish from the 
good land that the Lord is assigning yoU."45 By overruling the Torah 
in its correct meaning, the rabbis have diminished it, and the suste-
nance of the people diminishes correspondingly. 
As for the image of Eliezer's fatal gaze, his excommunication 
emphasizes once again Eliezer's role as truth-finder and truth-keeper. 
The law follows Eliezer, and, correspondingly, the world mirrors 
Eliezer. His inner devastation is total, and everywhere he looks he 
perceives only devastation. The outer world mirrors his inner world; 
wherever his eyes rest is incinerated, because Eliezer's inner world 
has itself gone up in flames. 
The paradox of authority, the naked assertion by authorities of 
their right to be wrong, has returned with a vengeance. Only now the 
issue is not the truth-versus-opinion, few-versus-many tensions in the 
Platonic interpretation. Now we confront the nasty, political side of 
authority, the infliction of real punishments on those who choose to 
defy the authorities. Eliezer's pain and humiliation are real, and it 
emphasizes how ruthlessly the rabbis suppress dissent. The story says 
that they gathered every object that Eliezer has declared pure and 
burned it-an image uncomfortably like the book-burnings of the 
Inquisition. The rabbis burn these objects knowing full well that the 
bat kol has declared them pure, so there is no need for the bonfire 
other than the need to assert their authority and extinguish Eliezer's. 
Striking parallels exist between the Oven of Akhnai parable and 
one of the deepest reflections on Christianity, Dostoevsky's "Grand 
Inquisitor" story in The Brothers Karamazov. In this story, Christ 
returns to Earth in Spain during the time of the Inquisition. He works 
miracles and "rays of Light, Enlightenment, and Power stream from 
44. AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 264 (translating Bava Metzia, *59b). 
45. Deuteronomy 11:13-17, The Torah 357 (Jewish Publication Society trans.). These 
verses are recited by observant Jews three times a day, as part of the shema, the basic affirma-
tion of faith. 
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his eyes and, pouring over the people, shake their hearts with re-
sponding love. "46 The Grand Inquisitor orders Christ arrested. That 
night, the Inquisitor visits Christ in his cell. He admonishes Christ to 
be silent. 
[Y]ou have no right to add anything to what you already said once. 
Why, then, have you come to interfere with us? For you have come 
to interfere with us and you know it yourself. But do you know 
what will happen tomorrow? .. [T]omorrow I shall condemn you 
and burn you at the stake as the most evil of heretics, and the very 
people who today kissed your feet, tomorrow, at a nod from me, 
will rush to heap the coals up around your stake .... 47 
Ivan Karamazov, who recounts the story of the Grand Inquisitor, 
imagines how his soliloquy continues. 
"Everything," they say, "has been handed over by you [i.e., by 
Christ] to the pope, and you may as well not come at all now, or at 
least don't interfere with us [the Church] for the time being .... 
Have you the right to proclaim to us even one of the mysteries of 
that world from which you have come? .. No, you have not, so as 
not to add to what has already been said once .... [F]ortunately, on 
your departure, you handed the work over to us. You promised, 
you established with your word, you gave us the right to bind and 
loose, and surely you cannot even think of taking this right away 
from us now. Why, then, have you come to interfere with US?"48 
The parallels to the Oven of Akhnai are obvious: once God has 
laid down His law, and created temporal authorities to administer it, 
He is not permitted to interfere with them. If He speaks through 
Rabbi Eliezer, Eliezer must be excommunicated. If He sends His own 
Son a second time, the priests must burn Him at the stake. The Grand 
Inquisitor story makes manifest the political authoritarianism that is 
latent in the Oven of Akhnai. For the Inquisitor makes it perfectly 
clear that in his view the ultimate issue is the need for authoritarian-
ism: "nothing has ever been more insufferable for man and for human 
society than freedom,"49 which Jesus advocated and the Church, after 
centuries of effort, was finally able to suppress. It is well-known that 
Dostoevsky's inspiration for the Grand Inquisitor was the remarkable 
right-wing French publicist Joseph de Maistre, an extreme ultramon-
tanist (that is, a proponent of absolute Church authority over tempo-
46. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 249 (Richard Pevear & Larissa 
Volokhonsky trans., 1990). 
47. Id. at 250. 
48. Id. at 251. 
49. Id. at 252. The Inquisitor adds, "There is no more ceaseless or tormenting care for man, 
as long as he remains free, than to find someone to bow down to as soon as possible." Id. at 254. 
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ral as well as religious matters), and perhaps the ultimate nineteenth-
century authoritarian, who exulted in authoritarian government as an 
antidote to human willfulness.5o 
It is obvious that the Inquisitor represents only one extreme 
strand of Catholicism, even conservative Catholicism; and of course 
there are obvious differences between the hierarchical structure of 
Catholicism, with one centralized authority, and the radically dis-
persed structure of rabbinic Judaism, with its endless collegial debates 
in hundreds of communities and schools. But there is no denying that 
traditional rabbis were and are fanatically jealous of their own 
authority and ruthless in their efforts to defend it. This is glaringly 
obvious in the religious politics of modern Israel, where the ultra-
orthodox rabbis have fought with every political tool at their com-
mand to suppress other strands of Judaism (and sometimes to battle 
each other)Y 
It is a mistake to equate authoritarianism with traditionalism. 
Rather, the debate over authoritarianism recurs throughout the his-
tory of the tradition; it is a debate within traditionalism itself. To take 
a particularly stark example, at one point the Jerusalem Talmud takes 
the anti-authoritarian stance: "Can it be the case that if they [the 
court] say to you that right is left and left is right, you should obey 
them? Scripture therefore teaches us 'to the right or to the left' (Deut. 
17:ll)-that ... right is right and left is left."52 But Rashi, in the elev-
enth century, takes the authoritarian side: "'To the right or to the left' 
(Deut. 17:11). Even if they tell you that right is left and left is right, 
obey them."53 Two centuries later, Nahmanides, an equally celebrated 
sage, defended Rashi's authoritarian dictum on the grounds that 
without court-imposed unanimity "the Torah will become several 
50. Maistre is most remembered for his paean to executioners: "[AlII grandeur, all power, 
all suhordination rests on the executioner: he is the horror and the bond of human association. 
Remove this incomprehensible agent from the world, and at that very moment order gives way 
to chaos, thrones topple, and society disappears." JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, The Saint Petersburg 
Dialogues: First Dialogue, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 183,192 (Jack Lively trans., 
1971 ). 
51. I recall walking past the main school of reform Judaism in Jerusalem; the front gate had 
the word Shalan (Satan) spray-painted across it by ultra-orthodox vandals. A reform rabbi 
remarked to me in Jerusalem that Israel is the only country in the world where it is legal to 
discriminate against Jews-for the ultra-orthodox parties have succeeded in huilding their own 
preeminence into the laws of the state. 
52. AUTHORITY. supra note 2, at 322 (translating Jerusalem Talmud Horayot *45d). 
53. Id. at 333 (translating Rashi, Sifre Deuteronomy 154). 
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Torahs."54 But in the year 930, an anti-rabbinite wrote: "When they 
say, 'Rabbi So-and-so said thus-and-so,' I answer and say, I, too, am 
the learned So-and-so."55 These striking examples represent a long-
standing debate within traditional Judaism over the legitimacy of dis-
sent and pluralism.56 (This is not the same as the equally longstanding 
debate over the legitimacy of legal innovation; indeed, the two de-
bates run perpendicular to each other. Anti-authoritarians sometimes 
criticize innovation because the power to innovate rests solely with 
the rabbinical courts: Leone Modena, writing in the early seventeenth 
century, asks "how [else] would the sages and Patriarchs lord it over 
their generation if there were no innovation and casuistry ... ?"57 Two 
hundred years later, Moses Sofer, a rabbinic authoritarian, counterat-
tacks against the innovations of the haskalah, the anti-authoritarian 
Jewish Enlightenment, by insisting, "The principle is, Anything new is 
everywhere forbidden by the Torah."58 Both innovation and conserva-
tism -a secular American reader might substitute dichotomies like 
judicial activism/judicial restraint or living-constitution/strict con-
struction -can be given either authoritarian or anti-authoritarian 
polarities. ) 
B. Coercive Logic 
The Oven of Akhnai story, on the current reading, represents a 
defense of rabbinic authoritarianism, even against God Himself. It 
seems especially noteworthy that Rabbis Joshua and Jeremiah use a 
logical trick to compel God to leave their authority intact - in effect, 
they use logic to neutralize God. Earlier I gave an example of a logic 
puzzle by Raymond Smullyan, the trick by which Scheherazade 
forced the king not to execute her. Reflecting on the puzzle, Smullyan 
writes: "The question Scheherazade had asked the king had an almost 
magical quality in that it forced him to do something he wouldn't oth-
54. Id. at 334 (translating Nahmanides (Moses ben Nahman), Commentary on the Torah, 
Deuteronomy 17:11). 
55. Id. at 348 (translating Salmon ben Jeroham, Book of the Wars or the Lord, Cantos l-
ID· . 
56. See the many selections on this subject in AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 244-378. If it 
has not already become apparent, this is a suitable moment for me to acknowledge that it would 
have been impossible to write this paper without this magnificent book. the first of four pro-
jected volumes surveying the Jewish political tradition, with newly translated selections and 
commentaries by distinguished political philosophers. 
57. Id. at 289 (translating Leone Modena (attrib.), Kol Sakhal. Second Essay, Chapter 5). 
58. Id. at 295 (translating Moses Sofer, Responsa Hatam Sorer, Orah Hayyim [:28). 
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erwise have done-namely, to spare her life."s9 Smullyan labels 
statements and questions that force people to do things coercive 
/ogic,60 and he offers many amusing examples."1 The name "coercive 
logic" seems entirely apt, and it suggests that in the Oven of Akhnai 
the two rabbis are trying to coerce God Himself, in order to free the 
field of action for their own exertion of authority over Eliezer and the 
rest of the community. 
How can logic coerce God? All coercive logic puzzles share the 
same underlying structure: the target promises to abide by a seem-
ingly-innocuous verbal rule (like "answer a yes-no question truth-
fully" in Scheherezade's stratagem), and then the coercer embeds a 
description of an action (the one the coercer wants the target to take) 
in a sentence cleverly constructed so that logical deduction applied to 
the sentence, under the rules the target has agreed to, yields the act-
description as a consequence_ The mechanism of coercion is also the 
same in all coercive logic puzzles: the moral compulsion of the vic-
tim's promise joins with the logical compUlsion of the inference to 
force the victim's hand. Obviously, logic alone cannot compel ac-
tion - but logic together with a promise can compel action provided 
that the victim is willing to speak consistently and keep his promise. 
The entire practice of courtroom argumentation, to the extent that it 
employs logical argument rather than rhetoric, amounts to little more 
than an extended exercise in coercive logic. Without coercive logic, 
the rule of law would have no essential connection with reason, at 
least in its deductive form. 
59. SMULL YAN, supra note 15, at 85. 
60. Id. 
61. Here are two. Smullyan tells us that in his logic classes he used to lay a penny and a 
quarter on the desk in front of him. He would then call on a student to say something. If it were 
true, the student would receive one of the coins (Smullyan would decide which one); otherwise, 
the student would receive nothing. Smullyan observes that there is a statement the student can 
uller that will force Smullyan to give him or her the quarter; apparently, the point of the lesson 
is to get students to discover that statement. However, he eventually decided to abandon this 
teaching trick when he suddenly realized that a truly clever student could, with an appropriate 
statement, force Smullyan to give the student a million dollars. What are the two statements? 
(Try working it out before looking at the answers in the next paragraph.) [d. at 89-90. 
The first statement: "You will not give me the penny." It can't be false, because then 
the truth must be that Smullyan will give the student the penny, which he would only do if the 
statement were true, not false. Because the statement cannot be false, it must be true, so 
Smullyan must give the student a coin, and-because the statement is true-it cannot be the 
penny. Ergo, Smullyan has to give the student the quarter. The second statement: "You will give 
me neither the penny, nor the quarter, nor a million dollars." Work out for yourself why 
Smullyan must then give the student a million dollars. Id. at 93. 
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In the Oven of Akhnai, God's promise is clear. It appears in 
God's covenant with Israel, or rather in the series of covenants by 
which the Israelites bound themselves to the Torah and, reciprocally, 
God promised to be their God and allow them to thrive if they hewed 
to the Torah but to punish them if they deviated. Hence the priority 
that the two rabbis assign to the Torah and its injunction to follow the 
majority over the bat ko!. And the logical trick is equally clear: to 
obey God speaking through the bat ko! is to disobey the Torah, and 
thus they can obey God only by disregarding the bat ko!. The result is 
a case of coercive logic: Jeremiah's point is that God has promised to 
reward them for hewing to the Torah, and the Torah says, in effect, 
"Follow the majority and disregard anything that contradicts the ma-
jority-including a bat ko/." And the net outcome of the story is a 
pair of stratagems by which the rabbis secure their authority by neu-
tralizing God through coercive logic and excommunicating the dissi-
dent Eliezer. 
Alongside the Platonic interpretation and the humanistic inter-
pretation, we now have the power interpretation of the Oven of 
Akhnai. Rather than a reflection on truth and opinion, or a vindica-
tion of deliberative processes, the story represents a vindication of 
rabbinic power through craft and compulsion. It is a political story, 
one might almost say a public-choice story, and not a very nice one. 
In this connection, we may reflect that the Talmud is itself the prod-
uct of rabbinic Judaism, and the fact that the authors and redactors of 
the Talmud included a story that aims to secure the preeminence of 
rabbinic courts over dissidents, and even over God, should scarcely be 
surprising. Earlier I noted that a Talmudic passage asserts that 
sages-rabbinical scholars-are superior to prophets and even to the 
Torah itself.62 Of course, the assertion was written by (who else?) 
rabbinical scholars. In Marbury v. Madison, the power of judicial re-
view was established by (who else?) judges. Once we begin reflecting 
on the politics contained within the Oven of Akhnai story, it is only a 
small step to reflecting on the politics of those who wrote the story 
and placed it in an authoritative text. The Grand Inquisitor is nothing 
if not subtle, and he is sometimes indistinguishable from a rabbi or a 
judge. 
Earlier I noted a disturbing feature of Joshua's and Jeremiah's 
dismissal of the bat kol, namely that their authority rests entirely on 
62. See supra note 36 am! accompanying text. 
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their claim to be faithful expositors of the truth that they now insist 
they don't want to hear. To understand just how outrageous their 
argument is, notice once again that they immediately confiscate ob-
jects that they know are ritually pure-because the bat kal has told 
them so-and burn them as if they are impure. And henceforth they 
will require the community that follows their edicts to perform ritual 
acts that they (and perhaps they alone) know are ritually incorrect. 
And yet they will claim to govern the community on the ground that 
they are masters of ritual, and they will excommunicate anyone who 
disagrees with them. They are like the Grand Inquisitor, who burns 
Christ to prevent His words from interfering with the Church's politi-
cal supremacy, which has no basis other than the word of Christ. To 
call this hypocrisy seems like a grotesque understatement. It is a 
power-play grounded in a tissue of lies-power pursued, one might 
say, for its own sake. 
The Grand Inquisitor, at least, has a theological explanation for 
the cynicism and violence of his rule. He tells Christ that mankind is 
too weak and flawed for the freedom that Christ's teaching promises; 
and he freely confesses that centuries ago the Church secretly went 
over to the side of the Tempter in the Wilderness, who knows better 
than Christ that what humanity truly needs for its happiness is not 
absolute freedom but absolute submission. Dostoevsky'S analysis of 
the Temptation in the Wilderness story, with its tortured reflection on 
the agony of human freedom, is a masterpiece of existentialist blas-
phemy. The Talmud, unsurprisingly, contains nothing like this, no 
indication that the rabbis are secretly at war with the God they pre-
tend to serve in order to lord it over other men and women. (If they 
were, it is hard to imagine God smiling at them.) But what is their 
claim to authority, once they have rejected the heavenly voice? 
C. The Need far Artificial Unanimity 
The Oven of Akhnai story continues: 
Furthermore, Rabban Gamaliel [head of the academy] was in a 
ship; a great wave threatened to sink him. He said: "I suppose this 
is on account of Rabbi Eli'ezer." He stood up and said: "Master of 
the world, it is manifest and known to you that I have not done this 
for my honor nor for the honor of my father's house, but for Your 
honor, so that controversies should not abound in Israel." Then the 
sea ceased to rage.63 
63. AUTHORITY, supra nole 2, al264 (translating Bava Melzia *59b). 
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Rashi explains that Rabbi Gamaliel, as president (Nasi) of the 
court, had authorized Eliezer's excommunication. He adds that the 
reason was "to deter others from continually disputing the majority 
opinion."64 As we saw earlier, Rashi defends an extreme form of rab-
binic authority: even if the rabbis say right is left and left is right you 
must obey them. Apparently, his concern was simply that without 
finality in the majority opinion, the entire system of dispute-
resolution embodied in the rabbinic courts would unravel. In essence, 
Rashi fears that without a principle of res judicata that upholds even 
wrong opinions, disputes within the community will never be settled. 
A wrong opinion that settles the dispute is better than no opinion, 
and a dissenter like Eliezer who refuses to give up his dissent threat-
ens to unsettle decisions that the community urgently needs to remain 
settled. Provided that most of the court's opinions are well-reasoned 
and valid, the erroneous ones should be upheld just as stringently as 
the correct ones, for the entire system depends on compliance, and 
there is no reliable way to settle which decisions are the right ones 
except through the system itself. The overall utility of the system 
compensates for its occasional errors, and if the system acknowledged 
its errors its overall utility would drop. In baseball, if you argue the 
umpire's calls, he will eject you from the game even when he knows 
you are right. 
What saves this view from pure powermongering is the judge's 
public-regarding motive: Gamaliel excommunicated Eliezer neither 
for his own benefit nor for that of his family, but solely to meet a 
community need. Philip Soper has argued for an obligation to obey 
the law provided that the lawgiver is legislating in the good faith be-
lief that his rules are in the best interest even of those they disadvan-
tage.65 According to Soper, the obligation arises from the fact that 
some decision, even if it is wrong, is better for the community than no 
decision at all. He analogizes the enterprise of government to a life-
boat, where someone must take charge. Provided that the lifeboat 
commander acts in good faith, even someone he enslaves and forces 
to row has an obligation to obey.66 
This argument has some force, but it is far from decisive. Soper 
must show that the state is a lifeboat, that the only alternatives are 
64. Artscroll Talmud, supra note 2, at 59b' n.14-15 (translating Rashi's commentary on 
Bava Metzia *59b). 
65. PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 79 (1984). 
66. Id. at 88, 121. 
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unconditional obedience and pure anarchy, and that a false good-faith 
belief is better than nothing. I have my doubts that it is possible to 
show any of these thingsY In the same way, Rashi must show that the 
community cannot tolerate dissent and that if the rabbinic court lets 
Eliezer get away with dissent the community will be ruined. The 
power interpretation turns on precisely these issues. It seems pretty 
clear where the Oven of Akhnai story comes out on these issues: the 
moment that Rabbi Gamaliel reminds God that he excommunicated 
Eliezer in good faith, the wave that threatened to engulf Gamaliel 
subsides. 
V. THE INJURY INTERPRETATION 
A. The Tort of Wronging With Words 
But the power interpretation is not the end of the story, and 
Rabbi Gamaliel's argument does not save him forever. Let us con-
clude the tale of the Oven of Akhnai: 
Ima Shalom, the wife of R'Eliezer, was the sister of Rabban 
GamlieL From that incident [in which Rabban Gamliel excommu-
nicated R'Eliezer] onwards, she did not let R'Eliezer fall on his 
face, i.e., recite the tachanun supplication.6s 
The tachanun is the most somber prayer in the morning service-
a recollection of the persecution and humiliation of the Jews, a con-
fession that it results from our own sinfulness, and a prayer for God 
to "turn back from Your flaring anger and relent from the evil meant 
for Your people."69 Its images are powerful: "I am wearied with my 
sigh, every night I drench my bed, with my tears I soak my couch. My 
eye is dimmed because of anger, aged by my tormentors .... Look 
from heaven and perceive that we have become an object of scorn 
and derision among the nations; we are regarded as the sheep led to 
slaughter, to be killed, destroyed, beaten, and humiliated."70 As the 
Oven of Akhnai story indicates, the tachanun is recited with covered 
face. The reason that Ima Shalom will not permit Eliezer to recite the 
tachanun is that she fears the consequences if Eliezer reminds God of 
his misery and humiliation by reciting this abject prayer. 
67. I criticize Soper's argument in David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious 
Lawbreakers, 52 U. PIlT. L. REV. 793, 806-09 (1991). 
68. ARTSCROLL TALMUD, supra note 2, at 59b2 (translating Bava Metzia *59b). 
09. THE COMPLETE ARTSCROLL SIDDUR 135 (Rabbi Nosson Scherman trans., 1990). 
70. Id. at 133. 135. 
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We learn this because the story relates that one day Ima Shalom 
made a mistake and failed to stop Eliezer from reciting the tachanun. 
She 
found [R'Eliezer] falling on his face in the recitation of tachanun. 
She said to him: Get up! You are killing my brother! Meanwhile, an 
announcement went forth from the house of Rabban Gamliel stat-
ing that he had died. [R'Eliezer] said to his wife: How did you know 
about Rabban Gamliel's death? She said to him: I have received 
such a tradition from the house of my grandfather, King David: All 
the gates of Heaven are locked, except for the gates of wrongdo-
ing.71 . 
Oddly enough, this enigmatic ending to the story contains the 
core of its legal significance (and points us to our fourth way of read-
ing the Oven of Akhnai). 
I have mentioned that the Talmud's literary form is simply an ex-
tended commentary on the Mishnah, the earliest codification of the 
law. The Oven of Akhnai story appears in a section dealing with tort 
law, and, more specifically, in a subsection on injuries done to others 
with words: the entire discussion concerns the Mishnaic injunction, 
"Just as there is wronging in buying and selling, so there is wronging 
with words."72 Ima Shalom's final cryptic statement about her grand-
father King David is a reference back to the discussion of the tort of 
wronging with words immediately preceding the Oven of Akhnai 
story. There the rabbis cite a psalm of David to support their asser-
tions "that God metes out strict retribution to someone who wrongs 
his fellow," and that punishment follows soon after the tearful prayers 
of the victim.73 The Oven of Akhnai story is then offered as an illus-
tration of this point of tort law. Gamaliel has wronged Eliezer. The 
moment that Eliezer recites the tearful tachanun prayer, which la-
ments his humiliation and calls on God to help him, Gamaliel's 
punishment becomes inescapable. 
In the pages preceding the Oven of Akhnai, the Talmud analyzes 
the prohibition on wronging with words as a prohibition on humiliat-
ing others, and the rabbis condemn the humiliation of others in the 
strongest possible terms: "If anyone makes his friend's face turn white 
from shame in public it is as if he has spilled blood."74 "It is better that 
71. ARTSCROLL TALMUD, supra note 2, at 59b2-59b3 (translating Bava Metzia *59b). 
72. /d. at 58b' (translating Bava Metzia *58b). Stone notes this point about the story's 
context in Stone, supra note 1, at 857. 
73. /d. at 59a'(translating Bava Metzia *59a). 
74. /d. at 58b3 (translating Bava Mctzia *58b). 
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a person should cast himself into a fiery furnace than that he should 
shame his fellow in public. "75 (In light of these passages, the innumer-
able daily humiliations that Israel inflicts on the Palestinians may be 
seen as a direct affront to core precepts of traditional Jewish ethics; 
and it is perhaps with this tradition in mind that the distinguished 
Israeli philosopher A vishai Margalit has defined a decent society as 
one the institutions of which do not humiliate people - a definition, as 
he makes clear, that he arrived at by reflecting on the Occupation.76) 
The rabbis next discuss a number of special cases of humiliation, and 
conclude the section with the Oven of Akhnai story. Viewed through 
the lens of its Talmudic context, the focal point of the Oven of 
Akhnai fable is not the nature of legal authority, but rather the hu-
miliation of Eliezer. 
B. The Problem of Dirty Hands 
But of course the Oven of Akhnai story is not simply a peculiar 
footnote to a discussion of the tort of humiliation. It is that, but it is 
also all the other things we have seen. One peculiar contradiction in 
the story is that God spares Rabbi Gamaliel from drowning when 
Gamaliel offers his utilitarian argument for excommunicating Eliezer, 
but in the end strikes Gamaliel down in punishment when Eliezer 
recites the tachanun. The former passage suggests that God accepts 
the utilitarian argument for ruthless rabbinic power, while the latter 
suggests that God does not. How can we explain this anomaly? Ap-
parently, the story contemplates an interesting possibility: that an 
exercise of power like Gamaliel's can simultaneously be justified on 
grounds of political morality, and condemned for the wrong it does to 
an innocent. 
In 1973, Michael Walzer published a famous essay, Political Ac-
tion: The Problem of Dirty Hands,77 which explores the dilemma of 
politicians who must inevitably get their hands dirty in order to gov-
ern. "[A] particular act of government ... may be exactly the right 
thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it 
guilty of a moral wrong."78 Evidently, that precisely describes the 
situation of Rabbi Gamaliel in the Oven of Akhnai. Walzer offers no 
75. Id. at 59a'(translating Bava Metzia *59a). 
76. AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY xi-1 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996). 
77. Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 
160-80 (1973). 
78. Id. at 161. 
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resolution to the paradox inherent in the problem of dirty hands (the 
paradox is that the same act can be at once the right thing to do and 
morally wrong), but he considers several approaches to it that in his 
view seem partly right.79 One, the Machiavellian approach, simply 
acknowledges that the successful prince's actions are sometimes mor-
ally wrong. Without denying wrongdoing or making excuses for it, 
Machiavelli nonetheless commends the actions on the ground that 
they will win eternal glory for the prince who succeeds at govern-
ment.80 The problem, Walzer observes, is that Machiavelli's solution 
simply leaves the paradox unresolved. A second strategy, found in 
Max Weber, insists that the political actor must pay a price for his 
wrongdoing, by suffering qualms of conscience for it: he is to be a 
suffering servant.81 Walzer thinks this is closer to the right track than 
Machiavelli's commendation of glory, but he observes that few of us 
will be satisfied knowing that the ruthless politician's conscience is 
troubled. Only the politician decides how troubled his conscience will 
be, and whether he is easy or harsh on himself, the performance 
seems a trifle pointless. "We suspect the suffering servant of either 
masochism or hypocrisy or both .... "82 
The third position Walzer illustrates with Camus's The Just As-
sassins, a play in which anarchist murderers rejoice in their own hang-
ing, because they find their crime incomplete until they have been 
hanged for it. While Walzer is bemused by Camus's melodramatic 
moral extremism, he agrees that when a politician "lies, manipulates, 
and kills ... we must make sure he pays the price."83 He adds: "We 
won't be able to do that, however, without getting our own hands 
dirty, and then we must find some way of paying the price our-
selves."8~ I am far from sure that Walzer's solution makes sense. The 
problem is not just that the final sentence I quoted toys with the 
prospect of an endless cycle of bloodshed and retribution. The prob-
lem is also that making sure the politician undergoes punishment for 
his wrongdoing may deter him from doing it, and that fails to take 
seriously the other half of the paradox, that getting his hands dirty is 
the right thing to do, indeed the thing we count on him for. 
79. Id. at 175--80. 
80. /d. at 175-76. 
81. Id. at 176-78. Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor may rail into this category. 
82. Id. at 177. 
83. Id. at 180. 
84. Id. 
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Satisfactory or not, it seems clear that the Oven of Akhnai story 
represents the third strand of Walzer's argument, with an intriguing 
twisL Gamaliel suffers no punishment for the wrong he does Eliezer 
until Eliezer himself calls on God through the recitation of the tacha-
nun. God, apparently, is willing to leave Gamaliel's dirty hands well 
enough alone as long as Eliezer does not complain. When he com-
plains, God acts. 
There is no doubt something to be said for this as a law enforce-
ment strategy-it is a way of ensuring that the rigors of punishment 
are reserved for vindicating the victims who feel the wrong most 
keenly, permitting social healing for those who do noL It is also a way 
of conserving scarce enforcement resources, although of course scarce 
resources are not a problem for omnipotence. At the same time, we 
well understand that sometimes the most downtrodden victims are 
the ones that do not complain, precisely because they are downtrod-
den-and we should not be oblivious to the perverse lesson that ruth-
less powerholders might draw from Gamaliel's punishment, namely 
that they will be better off killing dissidents before they complain 
rather than merely excommunicating them. 
Perhaps there is a simpler lesson that the ending of the Oven of 
Akhnai intends to teach. Even though it offers a vindication of rab-
binic authority on political grounds-the need for artificial unanim-
ity - in the final paragraphs the story seems to assert the primacy of 
the personal. It says that there are good reasons for court authoritari-
anism-reasons good enough that God merely smiles at being tricked, 
and spares the ruthless judicial politician Gamaliel when He is reas-
sured that Gamaliel's ruthlessness was not merely a personal power-
grab. But regardless of how good the reasons are, humiliating the 
innocent to maintain authority is always and fundamentally a rupture 
of human relations. It is, in the last analysis, always wrong, and no 
utilitarian justification can make the wrong go away. 
VI. ANTI-CONCLUSION 
There is no such thing as an innocent act of reading-no "read-
ing degree zero" in which the reader simply plumbs a text without 
importing an agenda of questions and an array of conceivable an-
swers. I would have liked to conclude this Article by writing that the 
Oven of Akhnai story sounds universally-interesting themes about 
authority and law-as we have seen, at least four such themes. But I 
cannot write that conclusion. 
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The fact is that the issues explored here may not be universal, 
and, more importantly, the underlying assumption that universality 
matters is not universal. To those who insist upon their own cultural 
particularity, a question is dangerous and threatening precisely to the 
extent that it claims to be of universal interest. The questions I bring 
to the Oven of Akhnai come from a source entirely external to the 
Talmud, as a glance at my footnotes reveals: they come from a tradi-
tion of modern philosophy and English-language legal theory featur-
ing names like Arendt, Cohen, Dworkin, Farber, Hampshire, Holmes, 
Hume, Kierkegaard, Margalit, Shapiro, Soper, Stone, Waldron, and 
Walzer. All these writers are, in an important sense, children of the 
Enlightenment. A perceptive reader will also notice that most of 
them are Jews, and that my own Jewishness (perhaps theirs as well) is 
hardly incidental to the essay. It is nevertheless a Jewishness that has 
passed into an entirely different world than that of the Talmudic 
academies. All Jews today are children of the Enlightenment-the 
haskalah, the reform movement with roots in the secular Enlighten-
ment. That is true even of the ultra-Orthodox, who represent a self-
conscious return to tradition rather than its unmediated continuation. 
And so I cannot say that the Oven of Akhnai story implicates 
universally interesting issues about authority and law. Furthermore, I 
am brought up short by the thought that in an important sense I can-
not understand the Oven of Akhnai story at all. 
I cannot understand the Oven of Akhnai story at all. It is not 
written for me. It is written for readers within a tradition that I merely 
peer at from outside. I never studied Gemara or experienced the in-
tellectual rigors of the cheder. I do not govern my life by the com-
mandments, and, except as an exercise in sympathetic projection, I 
cannot take seriously the legal question that Eliezer and the other 
rabbis debated-whether an oven made of sections cemented to-
gether with sand might be tahar (pure) even though it has come into 
the vicinity of tumah (religious pollutions inherent in certain people 
or objects).R5 I barely know who Rabbis Eliezer, Gamaliel, Joshua, 
85. For the record, the connict derives from several texts in the Mishnah. The Mishnah 
section entitled Kelim enumerates twenty sources of uncleanness (tumah), and states, "Lo, these 
render man and vessels unclean by contact, and earthenware vessels by r presence within the 
vessels' contained] airspace." MISHNAH NEW TRANSLATION, supra note 9, at 893 (translating 
Kelim 1:1). Another text declares that an oven becomes susceptible to tllmah from the moment 
its manufacture is complete, and goes on to specify that its manufacture is complete when it has 
been baked at a temperature hot enough to bake a sponge cake. ld. at 900 (translating Kelim 
5:1). Thus, the question becomes whether the oven cut into sections and reassembled with 
unbaked mortar satisfies this condition. The Mishnah raises this question in a cryptic passage 
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and Jeremiah were supposed to be (other than second-century sages), 
and I am wholly incapable of the method of argument within the tra-
dition-pulling together proof texts scattered throughout the Gemara 
and the Tanakh (the Hebrew bible). 
The tradition itself locates the authority of scholars in a chain ex-
tending back to Moses.86 As I indicated earlier, one part of that tradi-
tion ascribes superiority to the Oral Law over the Torah itself - "The 
teachings of the Scribes [rabbis] are more cherished than those of the 
Torah."87 From that standpoint, no one who is not steeped in the Oral 
Law can really understand the basic texts of Judaism, any more than 
someone who has studied every line of the U.S. Constitution but 
knows nothing of Supreme Court cases can really understand consti-
tutional law. Unable to trace the lineage of my reading back in an 
unbroken chain to Moses, I am not really a reader in the only sense 
the tradition takes seriously. 
Of course, within religious traditions themselves we invariably 
find strands that insist on the possibility of un mediated readings of 
sacred texts-innocent readings, readings degree zero. Protestants 
broke with Roman Catholicism by insisting that Scripture belongs to 
everyone, and Luther's translation of the Bible into German was a 
deeply subversive act. Within Judaism, a sect known as the Karaites, 
dating back to eighth-century Babylonia, decried rabbinic interpreta-
tion and the Oral Law and insisted on reading the Torah directly.88 As 
Sanford Levinson and Thomas Grey have pointed out, this dispute 
has counterparts in American constitutionalism.89 
The history of the Counterreformation makes obvious that such 
teachings invite violent responses. Early Protestants, like Jews, faced 
the Grand Inquisitor and the auto da fe. But Karaites received no less 
hostile reception from the rabbis. A group of Spanish and Portuguese 
Jews, practicing their religion secretly during the time of the Inquisi-
that originates our story: "[If] he cut it up [breadthwise] into pieces and put dirt between each 
ring- R. Eliezer declares lit] clean. And sages declare [it] unclean. This is the oven of Akhnai." 
Id. at 902 (translating Kelim 5:10). These three lines are the entire source of our story. 
86. "Moses received Torah from Sinai and passed it on to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders, 
and the elders to the prophets, and the prophets passed it on to the Men of the Great Assem-
bly." AUTHORITY, supra note 2, at 254 (translating Mishnah Avot 1 :1). 
87. !d. at 261 (translating Midrash Rabbah: Song of Songs 1:2). 
88. See id. at 281--89, 536. The Karaites were also textual literalists, but for present pur-
poses that is not as relevant as the fact that they insisted on an un mediated encounter between 
reader and text. Such an encounter need not imply textual literalism. 
89. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-53 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The 
Constitlllion as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
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tion, finally gave up their double life and emigrated to Amsterdam. 
During their closeted years, they had lost their knowledge of rabbinic 
Judaism and practiced their faith simply by reading the Torah; they 
became, in effect, involuntary Karaites. The Amsterdam synagogue, 
thriving in the tolerant atmosphere of Holland, proved that it was not 
so tolerant itself: it excommunicated them, just as Joshua and Gama-
liel excommunicated the de facto Karaite Eliezer.90 Karaism is the 
ultimate heresy, a threat to rabbinical authority. 
The thoughts in the last paragraph obviously reflect the power 
interpretation, and no doubt the power interpretation reassures 
Karaites that those who condemn them are merely playing politics. 
But matters are not that simple, for in an important way Karaites 
misunderstand what it means to read a legal text. Wittgenstein wrote: 
"To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life."91 By definition-
one might say by self-definition - Karaites cannot participate in the 
conversation, the form of life, that makes up the Talmud. And in this 
respect, an outsider reader of the Oven of Akhnai is like a Karaite, 
someone who thinks it is possible to read a section of the Talmud 
simply by reading its words. That assumption inevitably begs the 
question, because the words alone are like a bat kol, and the Oven of 
Akhnai tells us to disregard the bat kol and follow the majority. 
Those within the tradition understand that the story's real meaning is 
for members only. It does not disclose itself to modernist readers who 
privilege their own one-on-one relationship to the printed text over 
the many-on-many relationship between text and readers that makes 
up the form of life the text itself celebrates. 
There is a kind of vertigo that comes from reading a story that 
insists on its own unreadability. Of all writers, Borges is perhaps the 
one who most often takes metaphysical vertigo of this sort as his 
theme. Borges's heroes are mystics, antiquarians, theologians, and 
scholars of arcane doctrines whose research leads them into textual 
labyrinths (and who sometimes find real minotaurs inside them). In 
"Averroes' Search," Borges tells the story of a defeat inflicted on 
A verroes, the great medieval Islamic commentator on Aristotle. Aris-
totle's Poetics deals with the nature of tragic and comic drama, but 
A verroes labored under the disadvantage that theater was unknown 
90. See YIRMIYAHU YOVEL, SPINOZA AND OTHER HERETICS: THE MARRANO OF REA-
SON ch. 3 (1989). 
91. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §19 8e (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans .. 3d cd. 1958). 
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in the Islamic world. In Borges's ironic story, Averroes dines with a 
famous traveler who unsuccessfully attempts to describe a stage-play 
he witnessed in China. No one understands what he is talking about, 
and one dinner guest explains why such a thing is impossible. After 
the dinner, the philosopher returns to his study and at last thinks he 
grasps what Aristotle's peculiar words "tragedy" and "comedy" 
mean. 
With firm, painstaking calligraphy, he added these lines to the 
manuscript: Aristu [Aristotle] gives the name "tragedy" to panegy-
rics and the name "comedy" to satires and anathemas. There are 
many admirable tragedies and comedies in the Qur'an and the 
mU'allaqat of the mosque.92 
Of course, A verroes was completely mistaken. In the epilogue to 
his story, Borges offers the following reflection on the peculiar case of 
"a man who sets himself a goal that is not forbidden to other men, but 
is forbidden to him": 
I recalled A verroes, who, bounded within the circle of Islam, could 
never know the meaning of the words tragedy and comedy. I told 
his story; as I went on ... I felt that the work mocked me, foiled 
me, thwarted me. I felt that Averroes, trying to imagine what a play 
is without ever having suspected what a theater is, was no more ab-
surd than 1, trying to imagine Averroes .... I felt, on the last page, 
that my story was a symbol of the man I had been as I was writing 
it, and that in order to write that story I had had to be that man, 
and that in order to be that man I had had to write that story, and 
so on, ad infinitum. (And just when I stop believing in him, 
"Averroes" disappears. )93 
And therefore (but Borges cannot really say it), "Borges" disappears 
as well. 
The modernist reader approaching the Oven of Akhnai is like 
Borges approaching A verroes approaching Aristotle. To grasp the 
story is to realize that it concerns the impossibility of grasping it 
merely through reading. This may be true of all written law. The 
Oven of Akhnai is a labyrinth of meanings that would no doubt 
please Borges immensely. To recognize it as a labyrinth is already to 
know that you are lost in one of its innumerable dead ends. 
92. JORGE LUIS BORGES, Averrnes' Search, in COLLECfED FICfIONS 235, 241 (Andrew 
Hurley trans., 1998). 
93. Id. 
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